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Training courses for African oﬃcials have become one of
China’s most ambitious and important forms of cooperation
with the continent, and yet one of the least researched. Every
year the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) facili-
tates training courses in China for thousands of civil servants
in developing countries from all over the world to learn diﬀer-
ent aspects of China’s own development experience. Of them,
roughly 10,000 oﬃcials are from Africa, and all of them are
trained by China’s foremost universities, state bureaux, and
private companies.
Many other aspects of China’s overseas educational engage-
ments and knowledge transfers have been documented before
(Bra¨utigam, 1994; King, 2013; Li, 2013), but this paper aims to
present an in-depth study, based on ﬁeldwork in China, Ethio-
pia, Ghana, and Zimbabwe, on China’s short-term technical
and policy training courses on agriculture for the ﬁrst time.
China’s short-term training course program oﬀers an opportu-
nity to assess the nature of Chinese aid and cooperation, and
how technical and policy engagements articulate with wider
political and diplomatic ambitions, and the exertion of
Chinese ‘‘soft power”. Debates surrounding China’s aid
interventions in Africa have speculated on the existence of a
‘‘Beijing Consensus” in which the Chinese government exports
its model of authoritarian state capitalism to the developing
world (Halper, 2012; Williamson, 2012).
Given the scale of this program and its continued expansion,
it is important to ask in addition to assessing the immediate
impacts of the trainings on knowledge and skill transfer, what
lies behind such a program, and how it ﬁts with wider com-
mercial, diplomatic and geopolitical ambitions of China in
Africa. For example, we ask are these training courses aimed
at selling Chinese goods? Do they target African countries71with natural resources that are of interest to Chinese compa-
nies? And on what basis are candidates chosen for the training
courses?
The MOFCOM training courses therefore oﬀer a fascinating
insight into the feasibility of knowledge and experience trans-
fers from China to Africa. Not only because it is African
policy-makers and technicians that are being trained, but also
because many of the Chinese trainers have had ﬁrst-hand
experiences of eﬀecting the change that brought about their
country’s own developmental achievements. With regard to
agriculture in particular, there is a view of Chinese experiences
being especially transferable due to claimed similarities with
many African countries, as China has a range of agro-
climatic conditions to match any African environment (Li
et al., 2012). Since the 1960s, there have been numerous
Chinese engagements in African agriculture, often focused
on technology and skills transfer, through a range of training
programs, demonstration centers and investments (Amanor &
Chichava, 2016; Bra¨utigam & Zhang, 2013). This latest round
of investment in training and exchange is thus part of a longer
experience, and builds on this.Agricultural University
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paper begins by situating these training courses within the
context of relevant literature to date. We explore three themes:
the existence and implications of a so-called ‘‘Beijing Consen-
sus”; the role of commercial interests in development cooper-
ation; and the projection of ‘‘soft power”, with aid linked to
foreign policy. We in turn ask how each theme is represented
in the design and conduct of training courses. The main body
of the paper will then respond to these questions looking at
how training courses emerged in China’s aid architecture,
what they consist of, and what impacts they have had on
African oﬃcials so far.2. INVESTIGATING CHINESE TRAINING COURSES
There are three tiers of training course. The ﬁrst and most
common is for technical civil servants, such as extension
workers, and these courses may last for up to 3 months. They
have a focus on practical experiences and hands-on training.
The second tier is for more senior oﬃcials, and for shorter peri-
ods (maybe 2–4 weeks). These still have a ﬁeldwork compo-
nent, but are more about observing project implementation
and policy practices. The third tier of training course is for
ministerial-level oﬃcials, and permanent secretaries or equiva-
lents in the civil service. In this case the training course is often
organized around an individual minister’s timetable and would
last no longer than a fortnight. According to one course man-
ager, they last around 10 days and are interspersed with meet-
ings with political counterparts, and relevant business leaders
in China. 1 In 2012, for example, a State Minister for Forestry
in Ethiopia came on a course and met Li Keqiang when he was
the then Vice-Premier. 2 We interviewed participants in all
three tiers of training and exchange, but our participant obser-
vation and detailed interviews concentrated on the lower tier
groups, focused on technicians and more junior oﬃcials.
Fieldwork for this paper was conducted in 2013 and 2014 in
China, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Zimbabwe. We attended three
training courses for African oﬃcials in Beijing. One focused
on agricultural mechanization and was hosted by the Chinese
Academy of Mechanization Sciences (June 2013), another
focused on agricultural extension and was hosted by the Min-
istry of Agriculture’s Foreign Economic Cooperation Centre
(June 2013), and the ﬁnal one focused on rural development
and poverty reduction, and was hosted by the International
Poverty Reduction Centre (July 2013). Each course lasted
between 14 and 21 days, within which we attended a number
of diﬀerent sessions and had discussions with lecturers and
participants.
We also conducted semi-structured interviews with 10 train-
ing course managers in Beijing 3 (four of whom taught courses
themselves) from separate institutions, and in Africa we con-
ducted 36 semi-structured interviews with African oﬃcials,
including 18 from Zimbabwe, 14 from Ghana and 4 from
Ethiopia. 34 of these interviewees had attended training
courses and two had not.
Data on short-term training courses are limited, and so we
were able to compile only aggregate ﬁgures from oﬃcial doc-
uments. Speciﬁc data on ﬁnancing and participant details were
not publicly available; however, we were able to triangulate
with the lists of training courses posted on the website of the
Academy for International Business Oﬃcials (AIBO, 商务部
国际商务官员研修学院). We also undertook a detailed analy-
sis of the ‘‘MOFCOM Manual for the Management of For-
eign Aid Training” (商务部对外援助培训项目实施管理工作手册 (2010年8月修订版)), which gave a valuable insight as
to what was expected of the training courses by MOFCOM.3. UNDERSTANDING TRAINING COURSES AS PART
OF ‘‘DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION’’: THREE
THEMES
Technical and policy training has been an important element
of development cooperation over many years. A ‘‘moderniza-
tion” vision saw ‘‘transfer of technology” and, with this, partic-
ular skills as central. Unique elements in ‘‘successful”
development experiences were packaged and presented in
training courses, geared variously at senior policymakers, tech-
nicians and ﬁeld practitioners and students. This has been the
case across development programs, whether fromOECD coun-
tries, China, or institutions such as the World Bank, and has
involved courses ranging from agriculture to health to manu-
facturing and wider development policy (King, 2007, 2013).
In the 1950s, technology and knowledge transfers from
North to South were presented as an opportunity for the
Global South to ‘‘catch up” with the living standards and eco-
nomic success of the industrialized North (King and McGrath,
2004, p.18). While there have been extensive critiques of the
‘‘knowledge for development” paradigm in development
(e.g., Arce and Long, 1992; McFarlane, 2006), and some
particularly applied to Africa (Chambers, 1983; Mbembe´,
2001), resonances of such an approach remain, and training
is seen as central for development. In the discourse around
South–South cooperation, the lessons of the successful BRICS
countries are seen as potential models for transfer, including
through collaborations with Western aid programs (Amann
and Barrientos, 2014; IDS, 2014; Scoones et al., 2016). 4
In China’s case, it was already oﬀering various forms of
development cooperation with its partners from the early
1950s, but since its growth into an economic powerhouse, its
development assistance capacities have grown (Bra¨utigam,
2009). From a very early stage, China sought to oﬀer develop-
mental assistance to its partners on terms distinct from other
donors. Although the speciﬁcs of China’s programs have
evolved over time, Zhou Enlai’s ‘‘Eight Principles of Foreign
Aid” from 1963 still today oﬀer a good sense of the Chinese
approach. These included a rejection of any conditions placed
on aid-recipient countries and a commitment to ‘‘mutual ben-
eﬁt”, both characteristics that remain the hallmarks of Chinese
aid today.
Without a doubt, China’s increased aid spending and coop-
eration programs represent one of the most important recent
shifts in the development sector. Among these growing
engagements, African countries have emerged as some of the
largest recipients of Chinese aid and most frequent partners
in cooperation programs. According to the Chinese Govern-
ment’s 2014 White Paper on ‘‘China’s Foreign Aid”, Africa
received 52% of China’s foreign assistance funds during
2010–12 (Xinhua, 2014). Like the North–South technology
and knowledge transfers that came before, many are now very
interested in the question of what China can oﬀer African
countries in terms of development experiences (Li et al.,
2013; Ravallion, 2009; Zafar, 2010). China’s short-term train-
ing courses oﬀer an opportunity to understand the nature of
Chinese aid and cooperation through the lens of training
courses on agriculture and rural development. In this paper
we focus both on the immediate impacts (the ‘‘transfers”),
but also the wider context for training, and how training
eﬀorts ﬁt within a wider commercial and diplomatic eﬀort at
the heart of China’s engagement with Africa.
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questions for examination in relation to training courses for
each. First we consider the debate around whether there is
an emerging ‘‘Beijing Consensus”; second, we examine
whether there are commercial objectives attached to training
programs, and third we ask how training articulates with
foreign policy objectives and the exertion of ‘‘soft power”.
(a) Does training push a new ‘‘Beijing Consensus”?
Joshua Ramo argued that the ‘‘Beijing Consensus” involved
three elements that distinguish a Chinese development model.
These include ‘‘the value of innovation”, and particularly the
role of technology; looking beyond conventional measures of
development progress, such as GDP per capita and focusing
on quality of life; and an emphasis on self-determination
(Ramo, 2004, pp. 11–12). He argued that ‘‘it turns traditional
ideas like privatisation and free trade on their heads” (Ramo,
2004, p. 4). Since then others have built on this argument to
stress the importance of ‘‘state capitalism”, authoritarianism,
and a gradualist economic approach, based on policy experi-
ments, as compared with ‘‘shock-therapy” economic models,
typiﬁed by the earlier ‘‘Washington Consensus” (Hsu, Wu &
Zhao, 2011; Li and Wang 2013; Williamson, 2012).
Reference to a ‘‘consensus” also implies there is agreement
within the highest policy circles and intelligentsia in China
as to what constitutes the oﬃcially sanctioned development
model. Some have speculated that such a ‘‘consensus” model
may structure external engagements too. In his book ‘‘Charm
Oﬀensive”, Kurlantzick (2007, p. 56) for example argues that
‘‘In their dealings with other developing countries, Chinese
oﬃcials suggest that China has developed a model for social
and economic success, and in speeches to developing-world
audiences they increasingly sell the China model. . .. The
‘‘Beijing Consensus”.”
There has been much commentary on the idea of a ‘‘Beijing
Consensus”, particularly in the West. Much of this projects a
fear of Chinese domination, with arguments about challenges
to ‘‘liberal democracy”, and the spread of ‘‘authoritarianism”.
For example, Kurlantzick argues that ‘‘in the wake of the glo-
bal economic crisis, and the dissatisfaction with democracy in
many developing countries, leaders in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America are studying the Chinese model far more closely”
(Kurlantzick, 2013, p. 120). Similarly, Halper (2012, p. 100)
argues that the Beijing Consensus ‘‘presents an unmistakable
challenge to Western pre-eminence”, and that ‘‘The real China
challenge is political and cultural.” (Halper, 2012, p. 209).
Yet others have argued that there is little evidence for such a
consensus, driven by centralized authorities in Beijing
(Ambrosio, 2012; Bird, Mandilara, & Popper, 2012;
Ferchen, 2013). Within China, the ‘‘model” of development
remains highly contested, and debate continues as to what
approaches work, with multiple models emerging based on dif-
ferent provincial experiences, for example (Kennedy, 2010;
Mulvad, 2015; Gu et al., 2016). Indeed, one frequent argument
for the Chinese ‘‘model” is focused on policy experiments,
where options are tested out, and there is no standardized
approach, with the idea of ‘‘consensus” being fundamentally
misplaced (Husain, 2015). Deng Xiaoping best summarized
this approach when he told Ghana’s President Jerry Rawlings
in 1985: ‘‘Please don’t copy our model. If there is any experi-
ence on our part, it is to formulate policies in light of one’s
own national conditions.” (Alden, 2007, p. 131).
Training courses oﬀer a good lens on whether a particular
consensual ‘‘model” is being pushed. During Africa’s libera-
tion struggles there were stronger ideologically deﬁned devel-opment ties, including through training and exchange, when
China took an active role in promoting Maoist doctrines
among revolutionary groups as part of its geopolitical and ide-
ological conﬂict with the Soviet Union (Alden and Alves,
2008). As circumstances changed, so too did the transfer of
ideas between China and Africa. Earlier work by Deborah
Bra¨utigam has looked in depth at how Chinese ideas were
transferred through their aid programs both before and after
Deng Xiaoping’s reforms (Bra¨utigam, 1993). She demon-
strates the various ways in which Chinese development coop-
eration projects were heavily shaped by China’s own internal
politics and ideology. She concludes that ‘‘The Chinese. . .
never tried to export their revolutionary socialist model
directly, although they were always willing to discuss it with
interested visitors.” (Bra¨utigam, 1993, p. 342).
In our analysis of short-term training course programs, we
explored whether there was anything that might reﬂect some
agreed-upon message in the course guidance, curricula, course
materials or delivery. Was there a particular ‘‘model”—or
‘‘Beijing Consensus”—being pushed? Or was there a more
eclectic, diverse approach, representing multiple views and
perspectives on appropriate paths for agricultural develop-
ment?
(b) Do training courses help build commercial relations?
Chinese development engagements in Africa are often dis-
cussed in the context of China’s commercial interests. These
include a focus on gaining energy resources, minerals for
Chinese factories, and ﬁnding new markets to trade in
(Carmody, 2013). To be sure, Chinese companies’ economic
interests are large. By 2020 it is expected that 40% of China’s
iron ore demand, 60% of its crude oil consumption, and 70%
of its copper and potassium needs will have to be imported to
maintain its economic growth (Ferdinand, 2012, p.88). Africa
provides much of these materials among others and during
2000–15, China–Africa trade has grown from US$10 billion
to roughly US$300 billion, with expectations that it will reach
US$400 billion by 2020 (Xinhua, 2015).
Like many powerful countries around the world, China has
come to use development cooperation as a means of building
relationships on many fronts. However, whether there is a
direct link between development cooperation programs,
including training, and commercial interests remains a moot
point. In some cases, this relationship between aid and
broader interests is made clear by China signing trade, aid,
and political agreements all at the same time. The triannual
Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) is perhaps
the most salient example of this. Others point to Chinese con-
struction companies building transportation networks mainly
around resource extraction sites so as to facilitate their export
(Power et al., 2012), thus emphasizing aid, investment, and
commerce connections. More often than not, the reality is
somewhat mixed. Xu et al. (2016), for example, discuss the
Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centres that are
emerging across Africa. Acting as ‘‘turnkey” projects, these
merge development cooperation objectives with private sector
incentives, and have the aim of being transferred to African
counterparts after three years.
Furthermore, a common perception of Chinese economic
engagements in Africa is that this is a coordinated, centrally
directed aﬀair from Beijing. No doubt, China’s State-Owned
Enterprises (SOEs) continue to enjoy a large degree of ﬁnancial
and political support in sectors such as mining, oil extraction,
and telecommunications, however, this underestimates the
importance of provincial SOEs, private companies and
74 WORLD DEVELOPMENTindependent Chinese migrants that have established their own
relationships in Africa, often independent of any centralized
support Beijing (Cook et al., 2016; Gu et al., 2016).
That said MOFCOM, as a central ministry remains impor-
tant, and has responsibilities for both commerce and aid, so
it is unsurprising that these get mixed in its programs, including
training. In our work, we were interested to see how these train-
ing courses might feed into the Chinese government’s wider
commercial ambitions. We asked, for instance, were the train-
ing courses focused on certain countries where China has com-
mercial interests? Did those oﬀering the courses have incentives
to promote Chinese business and technologies? Were technolo-
gies presented on sale as part of the training package?
(c) Is training a route to exerting ‘‘soft power” as foreign policy?
Lastly, and cutting across the other points, our research was
interested in how these training courses ﬁt into the context of
Chinese foreign policy, and the exertion of ‘‘soft power”.
The term ‘‘soft power” emerged in the early 1990s (Nye,
1990), whereby co-optation through engagement of diﬀerent
sorts is used rather than coercion to achieve foreign policy
aims. This is achieved via a projection of culture, political val-
ues, and international moral standing (Nye, 2004). Soft power
can thus be exerted through everything from exported TV dra-
mas to training and scholarship programs. Indeed, educa-
tional aid has been closely tied to soft power throughout
recent history. In the case of countries like the UK, USA,
and Russia, it was only at the end of the Cold War that they
dramatically cut back their provision of scholarships for coun-
tries in the Global South (King, 2013, p.12). Foundations like
Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Ford formed an important part of
this history (Berman, 1983).
Drawing on this theory with relation to China, Li Anshan
and colleagues evaluate the country’s ‘‘Human Resource
Cooperation Programmes” in the context of the triannual
FOCAC meetings (Li & Yazini April, 2013). For Li and Yan-
zini, these fora are the centerpiece of China’s public diplomacy
with Africa. Authors within their edited volume point out that
education as a tool of diplomacy was similarly used by the US
in the post-World War II era, and that the country remains a
world leader in international education—both in terms of the
numbers of students it attracts and the model of education
that it oﬀers (Li & Yazini April, 2013, pp. 4–5). They also con-
clude that the African continent is ‘‘still enslaved by its history
given its total dependence on the Western media for informa-
tion dissemination” (Li & Yazini April, 2013, pp. 6–7). Based
on this, they argue that even if they are primarily a manifesta-
tion of Chinese interests, China’s Human Resource Coopera-
tion Programmes still oﬀer valuable alternative perspectives
for African participants.
Training courses are, they argue, not simply oﬀered ‘‘to
impose superpower practices, but [are] implemented as a
method of alleviating poverty and promoting better under-
standing between the two regions.” (Li & Yazini April, 2013,
p. 7) Furthermore, their engagements are not uni-directional;
FOCAC and its bi-products have equally become an impor-
tant part of each African country’s foreign policy toolkit. As
their relations with China continue to grow in strength, there
is therefore a natural desire among policymakers, academics,
and journalists to understand China better.
The nature of China’s educational aid is diﬀerent to that
oﬀered by other countries. While organizations such as the
UK’s Department for International Development repeatedly
mention the words ‘‘aid” and ‘‘poverty” in their policy docu-
ments on educational aid, these are scarcely found in theirChinese equivalents (King, 2013, p.4). Rather there is a focus
on terms such as ‘‘win–win”, ‘‘friendship” and ‘‘mutual coop-
eration” (King, 2013). China’s special position and experience
is also emphasized. Indeed, the very ﬁrst words of China’s
2014 White Paper on foreign aid state that ‘‘China is the
world’s largest developing country” followed closely by talk
of South–South Cooperation (Xinhua, 2014). Training courses
are seen by China as central, with signiﬁcant budgets allo-
cated. King states: ‘‘Like their large comparator cohorts going
to Germany and Japan, these thousands of professionals going
to several hundred diﬀerent training courses are almost cer-
tainly not going to see their numbers cut. This is a potent vehi-
cle of China’s soft power” (King, 2013, p. 207).
Deborah Bra¨utigam’s work on Chinese technology and
knowledge transfers has asked whether they are capable of
alleviating poverty and contributing to development
(Bra¨utigam, 1993, 1994, 2009). In particular, her book, ‘‘The
Dragon’s Gift” (2009), looks at a number of China’s technol-
ogy transfer projects to African partners. In many cases these
projects struggled when Chinese funding stopped and the
Chinese development actors left (e.g., Buckley, 2013).
However, when viewed in the context of ‘‘soft power” and
longer term ambitions, whether a particular knowledge, skill,
or technology transfer occurred may be less relevant than
the type of relationships established. In our work therefore
we asked: how did participants experience the courses? How
did this change perceptions of China? And what new
relationships were established as a result?4. CHINESE SHORT-TERM TRAINING COURSES:
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
With these three themes and associated questions in mind,
we now turn to examining the experience of training courses,
based on our ﬁeldwork in China and Africa. We will begin
with a presentation on the background of these training
courses and what the publically available Chinese government
documents say they aim to achieve. We then look at what a
typical training course consists of in terms of activities, subject
materials and course attendees. Lastly, we discuss what hap-
pens when the participants return home and how they use
what they learnt.
The China-based short-term training course program began
as a series of specialist seminars for African oﬃcials in 1998,
but then exploded into something much bigger when the
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) began
(King, 2013). At the founding conference in Beijing in 2000,
it was decided that a ‘‘Human Resources Development Fund”
would be established. 5 Based on ﬁgures available in China’s
2014 White Paper on Foreign Aid, it is possible to calculate
that China spent roughly US$836 Million (or 5.15 Billion
RMB) on its Human Resource Development Cooperation
(Xinhua, 2014). It is not clear, however, how much of this is
allocated speciﬁcally to the training course program in China,
as opposed to other forms of Human Resource Development
Cooperation such as scholarships and overseas training
courses which China sometimes supports (cf. King, 2013).
As a development cooperation program it is funded by the
Department of Foreign Aid in MOFCOM, and the short-
term courses are managed by MOFCOM’s ‘‘Academy for
International Business Oﬃcials” (AIBO). A number of courses
are also hosted at AIBO but more often funding is provided to
other Chinese institutions such as universities, research cen-
ters, and relevant companies. Flights, accommodation and
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Figure 1. Number of African participants enrolled per FOCAC conference period. Statistics gathered from public documents published by the forum on China–
Africa cooperation (FOCAC 2014).
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and stipends.
At every meeting since FOCAC began, the number of train-
ing courses oﬀered has risen steadily from 7,000 places pledged
during 2000–03, to 30,000 pledged most recently during 2012–
15 (see Figure 1). In the space of just over a decade, these
engagements have also far outstripped those of other donors.
Those closest to China in terms of numbers of training courses
are Germany and Japan; but whereas Germany hosts roughly
5,000 participants a year in its ﬂagship training courses (GIZ,
2014), China now hosts well over 10,000 per year from Africa
alone. And although Japan hosted roughly 400 courses in
2014. with between 5 and 20 participants per class (JICA
2014), China hosted a total of 494 with an average of 20–30
participants per class.
Since the end of 2012, AIBO has been recording information
about its training courses online. In 2013 and 2014, they
reported 539 and 494 training courses oﬀered, with 139 and
233 aimed exclusively at African oﬃcials respectively. 6 Just
from the 2013 numbers, we know this is not a complete list
since AIBO wrote in 2014 that: ‘‘By the end of 2013, AIBO
has organized 603 seminars/workshops including 43 Ministe-
rial Workshops, receiving 14,545 oﬃcials including 483 minis-
terial oﬃcials and 1 vice premier from 152 countries and
regions around the world.” 7
Of all 494 courses held in 2014, 30% were designated for
‘‘Anglophone Africa” and 17% for ‘‘Francophone Africa”,
although some African oﬃcials will have attended ones for
‘‘developing countries” (8%) and ‘‘Portuguese-speaking”
(3%) participants. 8 From the 2014 AIBO data we analyzed,
20.4% of courses were related to Agriculture (84), Fisheries
(4), Forestry (8) or Animal Husbandry (5), of which 73
involved African oﬃcials. These 73 courses were divided
across groups as follows: 35 for Anglophone Africa, 20 for
Francophone Africa, 14 for ‘‘Developing Countries” (in Eng-
lish), 2 for Arabic-speaking Countries and 2 for Portuguese-
speaking Countries. The lion’s share of this sample of training
courses was hosted in Beijing (30) and the remaining 43 were
spread fairly evenly across 12 diﬀerent provinces, as far apartas Hainan, Gansu and Jiangsu. Whatever the exact numbers,
we can certainly say that the numbers are large, and African
oﬃcials attend numerous courses across China hosted by a
variety of institutions (see below), on a range of themes, with
agriculture being especially important.
Participants are usually grouped according to their native
language, with courses oﬀered in Arabic, English, French,
Portuguese, Russian, and Spanish, however English often
serves as the lingua franca for more diverse groups. Occa-
sionally there are courses designed for speciﬁc countries,
but these are very rare (less than 1% of courses). Partici-
pants usually attend as the sole representative of their coun-
tries, but occasionally in groups of two. This means that
there is an enormous amount of diversity, whereby a Ken-
yan participant could easily be invited onto a course with
participants from places as diverse as Albania, Colombia
and the Cooke Islands. Our analysis of participant origins
shows no obvious preference for countries that were
resource rich or provided other commercial interests to the
Chinese government. Instead, courses are aimed at attract-
ing as many participants as possible from a very broad
pool.
To oversee the training course program as a whole, China’s
Ministry of Education (MoE) set up ‘‘Foreign Educational
Aid Bases” in a total of ten universities. 9 These ‘‘bases” are
tasked with ‘‘organising courses on their campus and abroad,
training the teachers used in foreign educational aid, and
undertaking any other foreign aid work entrusted to them
by various ministries.” 10 Fifty additional centers, including
companies, institutes and government departments were regis-
tered in 2009, but this number is likely to have increased even
more, given the expansion of funding and courses since then
(Fei & Zhang, 2009).
To decide on the general thrust of the curriculum on these
courses, the Chinese government also convenes a ‘‘National
Summit on Educational Aid and Human Resources Training
Work for Developing Countries” (全国对发展中国家教育援
助人才培训工作会议). 11 These meet annually and involve a
mixture of key ministries such as the Ministries of Education,
76 WORLD DEVELOPMENTCommerce and Foreign Aﬀairs, as well as any other relevant
institutions and individuals involved in foreign educational
aid work. For instance, in 2008 the sixth such conference also
included the Ministry of Agriculture for the purposes of dis-
cussing China’s agricultural short-term training courses. 12
These annual gatherings are perhaps the strongest signal that
training is an important tool in China’s foreign policy and soft
power projects.
Although public information on these meetings is scarce, a
summary report on the 2009 conference gave an insight into
how Chinese policy makers want institutions to present these
training courses. The title of the conference was ‘‘Driving
China-Africa Education Cooperation, and Increasing the
Inﬂuence of Chinese Higher Education towards Africa” (推
进中非教育合作提升中国高校对非洲的影响力). MOFCOM’s
director of the department of foreign aid (Wang Shichun)
spoke of the ‘‘important political, economic, cultural and
strategic meaning” behind educational cooperation with
Africa and stressed that:
‘‘from today, educational aid and training work needs to more
emphatically broadcast Chinese culture, enhance the understanding
and friendship of developing countries towards China, increase Chi-
nese inﬂuence, aﬃnities, and inspirations in developing countries,
impel developing countries to identify with China’s development the-
ory at a higher level, remove diﬀerences of opinion and misunderstand-
ings, and together build the foundations of China-Africa friendship, to
drive forward the building of a more harmonious world”
[Fei & Zhang, 2009, pp. 67–68]
The Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs’ deputy head of the Africa
department then added to this by speaking of the diplomatic
value of educational aid (Fei & Zhang, 2009). Both interven-
tions highlighted quite explicitly the ‘‘soft power” objectives
of training. However, the topics discussed in break-out meet-
ings remained technical and operational, and included ‘‘how
to choose better teachers and volunteers for African educa-
tional aid”, ‘‘how to do good follow-up work within educa-
tional aid”, and ‘‘how to speed up the implementation of
education’s ‘‘going out” strategy”. The technical and the polit-
ical are always enmeshed, and diﬃcult to disentangle.
MOFCOM has also produced a manual with over 60 clauses
for institutions to refer to regarding how to manage one of
these courses. The manual actually oﬀers very little by way
of curriculum prescriptions; much of it is made up of admin-
istrative information about how to run the courses, arrange
travel for the participants and the presentation of ﬁle receipts.
However, the manual is revealing on how MOFCOM sees
training courses in relation to wider foreign policy and com-
mercial ambitions. Right at the start, it states that the purpose
of the courses is to ‘‘complement China’s comprehensive for-
eign policy needs, help train the human capital of developing
countries, and drive forward friendly relations and trade coop-
eration with developing countries.” 13 Regarding the promo-
tion of a ‘‘consensus” on Chinese development, the
recommendation is that all courses should:
‘‘Possess an advanced quality: Course content should reﬂect China's broad
development achievements and strengths in relevant ﬁelds or disciplines,
and point out that China's economic development achieved substantial suc-
cess principally after the reform and opening period.” 14
A further clause states: ‘‘So that oﬃcials may wholly under-
stand China’s state of aﬀairs, all projects should arrange a visit
outside their provincial city to inspect underdeveloped
regions.” 15 Images of modernity and underdevelopment are
both drawn upon repeatedly withinChinese foreign policy, con-
trasting the diﬀerent development paths taken within China.
Chinese foreign policy at once aims to express solidarity withits Global South partners that it too is still a developing coun-
try, and also wants to impress. By stressing Chinese technolog-
ical prowess and economic achievements, this not only oﬀers
partners hope, butmay also convince them thatChina is a coun-
try that they can turn to for advice and material support, given
its similar, recent experiences, unlike the West.
Many African training course participants we interviewed
spoke of how impressed they were with China’s symbols and
expressions of modernity. When asking a Zimbabwean Roots
and Tubers Extension Specialist from the Ministry of Agricul-
ture about her perceptions of China, she commented: ‘‘My
perception of China really changed. Before I went, I just had
the impression of China being full of low quality products,
but when I got there I saw they had all the brands we know
like Sony Ericsson.” 16 The fact that Sony Ericsson is not a
Chinese brand clearly did not matter, the fact is they had suc-
cessfully conveyed a strong image of modernization and cut-
ting edge technology. Others similarly talked about how
impressed they were at the cities they visited.
These short-term courses therefore form an integral part of
China’s foreign policy strategy, linking both ‘‘soft power” with
commercial objectives. Whether a single ‘‘consensus” model is
projected is however more questionable, as there is little pre-
scription on curriculum content, and now a huge diversity of
training providers.
Oﬃcial documents and statistics (of varying quality) tell one
story, but what happens in training courses—and in the wider
interactions that occur around them? This is where training in
practice may be diﬀerent to training in theory. In the next sec-
tion we look at the practice of training, and reﬂect on our
observations of courses, and our interviews with both trainers
and trainees, asking how ‘‘soft power” is exerted, whether
training is linked to commercial opportunities, and if there is
a ‘‘Beijing Consensus” model being pushed.5. TRAINING IN PRACTICE: ENCOUNTERS IN THE
CLASSROOM
Beijing, 17 June, 2013: It was the ﬁrst day of a three-week
training course on Agricultural Mechanisation, and despite
the jet-lag there was an energy about the room. Thirty African
government oﬃcials and technicians were in a spacious confer-
ence room that could have held 80, on the 5th ﬂoor of a 20-
storey agricultural sciences research institute. Everyone was
sitting in rows facing the front, but only taking up a third of
the room. The lights were dimmed to see the projector screens
better. A young Chinese lecturer was speaking in Chinese, and
explaining the course. His interpreter translated into ﬂuent
French, and sat with the lecturer at the front of the room
behind tables that ran across the width of the room. The inter-
preter had lived for many years in Paris, and he occasionally
struggled with some of the more diverse French–African
accents in the room. However, during the discussions, conver-
sation generally passed ﬂuidly back and forth between the par-
ticipants and the lecturer.
The participants all worked for agricultural ministries in
Africa, most of them concerned with agricultural mechaniza-
tion. They were all men. The youngest was very newly quali-
ﬁed and the oldest in his early 50s. There were one or two
participants from most French-speaking African countries
and two French-speakers from Equatorial Guinea.
Presentations generally lasted 1–2 h. The morning covered a
background of China’s political, economic, and cultural his-
tory, along with a background of Chinese agriculture. In the
afternoon, there were presentations on diﬀerent models of
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lems were discussed using slide shows, and videos of the
machines in action around diﬀerent climates and contexts in
China. In the following days the participants would be bussed
out of the capital with their lecturers and interpreters to go
and see some of these machines in action.
Following the presentations participants asked questions;
some technical, some economic, some to do with labor impli-
cations. At the end of the afternoon, a participant from Benin
stood up and said of the ﬁrst day’s lectures ‘‘We thought it was
great! Thank you very much and thanks to the translator”,
then opened applause whereupon all the other participants
joined in.
This day nicely encapsulated a well-functioning training
course. The lecturers in most courses were usually a mixture
of academics, public oﬃcials, and businessmen and women.
They would ﬂow in and out for each class, with the participants
remaining in the same room for classes and coﬀee breaks until
the ends of sessions. MOFCOM’s handbook, as already noted,
repeatedly reminds lecturers to complement Chinese foreign
policy needs. To ensure this is carried out properly, all trainers
are required to ‘‘possess a good political standing” to be
allowed to teach. 17 The handbook also gives detailed instruc-
tions about ‘‘dressing neatly”, ‘‘using civilized language” and
‘‘not letting any other work get in the way [of the training
courses]” 18 (Fei & Zhang, 2009 Clause 53, own translation).
Lecturers almost always present in Chinese, and have inter-
preters to translate and facilitate dialog. On top of that there
will often be one or two university students who speak the
course language to assist with participants’ needs outside the
classroom. At the end of some classes Chinese agricultural
machinery companies handed out glossy marketing materials
and USB sticks with more information. Then, when classes ﬁn-
ished for the day, the university students or interpreters would
take participants for a big dinner before sending them oﬀ to
their hotel rooms (sometimes all in the same building as the lec-
tures), ready to begin again promptly the next morning.
Some courses are hosted within MOFCOM’s own internal
Academy for International Business Oﬃcials (AIBO). More
often though, MOFCOM funds other Chinese institutions to
carry them out based on their expertise. Returning to our sam-
ple data for 2014, of which 73 agricultural courses involved
African oﬃcials, we also looked at how courses were divided
among host institutions. We found that of these training
courses, 30 were hosted by Research Centres, 24 by Govern-
ment Departments, 12 by Universities and 7 by private compa-
nies. Many of the research centers were aﬃliated with
government departments and, as we found in our ﬁeldwork,
some also acted as conduits for Chinese agricultural technol-
ogy ﬁrms, such as the Chinese Academy for Agricultural
Mechanisation Sciences. Overall though, these ﬁndings pre-
sent a diverse spread of hosting institutions and suggested rel-
atively peripheral role for commercial interests, as discussed
further below.
No matter who or where they were, all training course orga-
nizers were asked to include elements of tourism for their par-
ticipants when possible, and Chinese hospitality over food and
drink was always part of the experience. More speciﬁcally, the
training courses had a clear remit to foster positive impressions
and good relations across diﬀerent levels of seniority. Percep-
tions varied, but most were overall positive. Some participants,
however, expressed concerns. Various points were mentioned:
some felt the training was too rushed; others said the food on
oﬀer was not to their liking; others complained that they were
not being oﬀered help to ﬁnd places of worship on holy days;
others raised questions about the quality of interpretation, asit made for stunted interactions. Overall, though, across all
our informants, very good impressions of China resulted.
The ‘‘soft power” of training was clearly working.6. ‘‘THE TRAINING IS NOT FOR FREE!’’
Although less important than building good relations, the
promotion of commercial interests is also mentioned in the
MOFCOM manual. This was especially important to the pri-
vate sector groups that oﬀered training courses, such as Long-
ping Hitech (a well-known hybrid seeds company, focusing on
rice), as well as some research institutions with commercial
links.
Training courses for more senior-level oﬃcials oﬀer a
stronger focus on commercial opportunities. During ﬁeld visits
to demonstration farms and companies, participants are
introduced to commercial opportunities, and they could buy
machinery or inputs presented to them. 19 For example, a
program oﬃcer from the International Centre for Bamboo
and Rattan said that through their training course program,
they had already established two projects in Ethiopia and
Nepal worth roughly US$3 million each with a further project
in Ghana in the pipeline. 20 The machinery for forestry and
bamboo production was produced by a commercial partner
and the training institution acted as a consultant and facilita-
tor in the process of getting the machinery running.
Roughly a third of the 34 participants interviewed were pre-
sented with opportunities to buy goods connected with their
training course; either directly from the host training institu-
tion, or from partners of theirs who participants were taken
to on ﬁeld visits. In the discussion of combined harvesters at
the course discussed earlier, one participant, impressed by
what he had heard, asked about purchasing the equipment,
to which the trainer answered that his colleague, Mr. Yang,
‘‘is sat next door and would be happy to discuss exports”.
However, only one of the African oﬃcials interviewed said
they had seen anyone purchase anything during the course,
and in her case she said it was just a senior oﬃcial buying a
tractor for his private farm. More often than not these are sim-
ply sales pitches for future business. One Ghanaian oﬃcial
said that if the Chinese company representative came to her
country, she would happily introduce him to her boss, and
chuckled that ‘‘The training is not for free!”. 21
A second commercial approach involved enlisting course
participants in market research. For instance, four oﬃcials
who had been on separate courses run by Longping Hitech
all spoke of how they had been given some of their hybrid seeds
to test at home. They were then encouraged to take pictures of
the seedlings’ progress and send them back to their lecturers
from the training course. A Ghanaian agronomist even said
that he was ‘‘currently preparing a proposal to hand to more
senior staﬀ suggesting that we invite Longping Hitech to come
and invest in Ghana”. 22 This was certainly a more enterprising
use of the training courses to promote the company’s medium-
to long-term commercial interests, and undoubtedly satisﬁed
MOFCOM’s wider commercial ambitions.
Lastly, some courses also oﬀered their services as consul-
tants. One Ghanaian agricultural extension worker explained
how on his course about fertilizer, their lecturer presented
them with ‘‘a very complex technology so the professor who
was in charge said that he wouldn’t teach us the technology,
but did it in the lab and brought it to us as a sample. Then
when we are interested, we inform our government, then they
will do it in whichever country you want. . .as a consultant.” 23
The interviewee said that he did not recommend this to his
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application technology would have been too expensive for
most farmers in his country. However, one participant from
Tanzania ‘‘told the professor that when he gets to his country,
he would see how best he could link them up to his govern-
ment.”7. WHITHER THE BEIJING CONSENSUS?
Was there a singular message being delivered in the courses?
Was this a promotion of a ‘‘Beijing Consensus”, a ‘‘model” of
Chinese development? A mixed picture emerged. Roughly half
the courses we observed and our interviewees attended were
focused on technologies and technical methods, and the other
half covered a mixture policy and management methods. But
the content was massively varied; from very speciﬁc technical
contributions to wider discussions of Chinese agricultural
experiences. The more policy-oriented courses did indeed
project a fairly standard narrative about Chinese success in
moving from a ‘‘developing country” to a modernized one,
but not without a consistent message as to the implications
in Africa. A singular ‘‘model” did not seem to be being
pushed.
To what degree is the process controlled by Beijing? All lec-
turers are asked to send in the curriculum they planned to teach
to their liaison in MOFCOM, but all of the ones we spoke to
said they had barely received any comments on these. By-
and-large it was up to the lecturers to decide what was impor-
tant concerning their topic. As a result, debates over agricul-
tural ‘‘best practice” sometimes contrasted across training
courses. For example, some participants attended courses that
promoted chemical fertilizers as part of their agricultural poli-
cies, 24 whereas other courses critiqued this approach stressing
the pollution they caused and available alternatives. 25
Given that oversight is fairly relaxed around the nature of
course content, the material delivered is fairly consistent with
heated debates that occur within China’s own academic, busi-
ness, and policy circles, with competing views on what consti-
tutes appropriate agricultural technology and policy. With
courses being oﬀered from diverse institutions from across
the country, and with diﬀerent lecturers with diﬀerent exper-
tise, there is no standard training package, much diversity in
content, and extensive debate. There is therefore no consensus,
and certainly none imposed by Beijing, despite the overarch-
ing, but rather general, high-level requirements of the MOF-
COM manual.8. RETURNING HOME: KNOWLEDGE, SKILL, AND
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER?
What happens when participants return home? Did ‘‘soft
power” have an eﬀect; did commercial opportunities get taken
up; and did a Chinese ‘‘model” get adopted and implemented
at home? In Africa we interviewed participants after they
attended courses, and gauged their responses, following their
exposure in China.
Of the 34 respondents interviewed, most indicated that there
was no direct, tangible impact of the courses in terms of tech-
nologies adopted and development practices changed. This is
partly to do with the fact that it is very hard to measure
impacts, and changes may be subtle. For instance, a Director
of Ethiopia’s Agricultural Mechanization Directorate spoke
very highly of a model in China whereby centers rented out
agricultural machinery to local farmers who could not buytheir own, but they had not been able to implement it as the
basic infrastructure and equipment was not available. 26
The greatest impediment to implementing the lessons from
the training contexts in home contexts was either that courses
were not relevant to the unique climate or socio-economic con-
texts the participants were from, or the job that they actually
carried out. For example, three respondents attended courses
that involved greenhouses for their practical exercises. These
courses were generally taught in China’s Northern provinces,
such as Shandong, where winters can be very cold. Ghanaian
colleagues said that they did not have the same need for green-
houses in their climate, and furthermore, that even though
there are still some advantages to controlling temperatures they
are too expensive for local farmers. Another respondent spoke
of being taught methods on the Prevention and Treatment of
Animal Epidemics that were relevant to intensive animal farm-
ing methods, despite Ghana not having this sort of industrial
farming. He said they were touring farms of about 1,000 ha
when the average farm in Ghana is 10–20 ha. 27
Courses thereforemay not be geared to local needs. Lecturers
do not know much about the oﬃcials they are training before
they arrive. Relevant institutions will apply to MOFCOM to
host a training course (or sometimes be picked by MOFCOM
directly based on their expertise) and then they will suggest
which countries might be appropriate for MOFCOM to invite
on their behalf. Course organizers have an incentive to have
over 20 people attend, or else they lose their funding. They then
list dozens of countries, since the aim of the training courses is
to bring as broad a mixture of countries together as possible,
with usually no more than one or two people from one country
in a course of 20–30 people. This means there are often signif-
icant diﬀerences between the agricultural contexts of each coun-
try present, and often quite divergent job roles.
Some complained that colleagues were using the training
visits to China as ‘‘shopping trips”, with some participants
not even being able to speak the language of the course they
were on. 28 A Chinese lecturer said ‘‘there are always one or
two such people in every class”. 29 African ministries are
allowed to pick which of their staﬀ go, although everything
is paid for by China. This introduces an element of patronage
among directors who select candidates. On the other hand,
there were cases mentioned where ministries picked an inap-
propriate candidate simply because they did not want to refuse
any invitations at the risk of not being oﬀered so many courses
the following year. 30
Yet even such cases proved valuable exercises. One animal
sciences lecturer explained this best. He had been sent on a
training course on tea that taught everything from choosing
and planting seeds to the harvesting and subsequent sales.
Not only was it irrelevant to his job, but furthermore he did
not even come from a region of Ghana where it was possible
to grow tea due to the heat. However, as he said:
‘‘Just because I haven't beneﬁted from this directly, this doesn't mean the
course was useless. . . I made some friends. Some in the tea business, and
we chat. I have the lecturers' contact details and I have informed that where
I am I'm not growing the tea. So we talk in general and of course I've got
my own personal tea plant with my name on it in the school [in China] and
they send me pictures. I've signed up to QQ 31 so that I can keep in touch
with them and we chat. I hope one day I will go back.” 32
Follow-up has also been held up by ﬁnancial constraints.
Only one respondent from Zimbabwe succeeded in gaining
funding upon returning home by applying for a grant from
the FAO to run a pilot project on cassava production and pro-
cessing. The pilot was a success and theMinistry of Agriculture
has since taken over the funding of this project. In fact, of the 34
oﬃcials interviewed, she was the only one who had tangibly
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her local context. Yet even in her case she remarked that it was
certainly not a direct transfer, but rather ‘‘the course gave us the
inspiration to see what was possible.” 33
Lastly, some participants commented on the lack of follow-
up support they received from their Chinese lecturers. Some
said they wrote to former lecturers with questions and got
no response. One department chief suggested that Chinese
training courses should be more like Japan’s whereby ‘‘they
will pick people speciﬁcally themselves and then work with
them over a period of time, so you can’t run away!”. 34 A Chi-
nese lecturer bluntly put it that ‘‘We haven’t yet done such a
thing [follow-up] yet, because this isn’t what is most important
for us.” 35 Yet this view was contradicted by others who said
that the Chinese government was taking a greater interest in
follow-up, so as to support knowledge and technology trans-
fers where possible, with a more hands-on approach.
Yet others commented that intensive follow-up and detailed
impact evaluation, characteristic of Western aid practice, does
not reﬂect China’s own development experience. Rather, train-
ing courses are seen as simply presenting China’s experiences
to African oﬃcials, and then it is up to them to transfer ideas
as they see ﬁt. Adaptive learning and experimentation is seen
as the approach, rather than pushing a singular model.
That there were so few identiﬁable uses of the knowledge
that came out of these courses, at least immediately, does
not mean that they should be seen as a failure. As one Chinese
lecturer put it himself when asked what his greatest success
was: ‘‘The communication of information and knowledge is
our biggest success. . . [As well as the] relationships we build,
because training isn’t everything.” 36 The relationships built
are not just of beneﬁt to the Chinese lecturers, but to the Afri-
can oﬃcials returning home too. For many it was the ﬁrst time
they left their country, and so the invitation came with the
opportunity of understanding agricultural and socio-
economic systems that were diﬀerent to their own. Moreover,
for many countries in Africa, China is now their biggest trad-
ing partner. Henceforth many working in government are
interested to understand this key economic and political part-
ner ﬁrst hand, and future interactions with China will be
informed by their exposure.
We found African oﬃcials to be very engaged in the training
courses we attended, and there was an overwhelmingly posi-
tive reﬂection on their experiences by the 34 former partici-
pants we interviewed. The courses were also very successful
at building strong personal relationships with government oﬃ-
cials from Africa, as part of a strategy that could be read as the
exertion of ‘‘soft power”.9. CONCLUSION
How then can we understand Chinese training courses on
agriculture and rural development for African oﬃcials in rela-
tion to the wider debates about Chinese engagement in Africa
identiﬁed earlier?
Given the diversity of courses, and sources of training, there
is no evidence of an overbearing, centrally directed ‘‘Beijing
Consensus” being peddled through the courses, either in the
abstract or with speciﬁc relation to agriculture. Instead, there
is much diversity and limited control, although with an over-
arching position on how trainings should be conducted. As
in China, with its diversity of development experiences, and
an experimental learning approach to policy, there is no singu-
lar model. In practice, training courses are less coherent, more
muddled and disorganized, than a consensus model would
imply, with debate about directions for agricultural develop-
ment central.
However, this does not mean that training courses have no
wider motives linked to them. We found much evidence,
including oﬃcially sanctioned encouragement, of commercial
links to training courses. Again this varied, with some courses
and lecturers involving a strong commercial interest, while
others did not. African interviewees found some beneﬁt in
the inclusion of commercial engagements, and some individu-
ally beneﬁted, while others planned to do so in the future. Yet,
despite being managed by MOFCOM, the commerce ministry,
private sector engagements were piecemeal and not coordi-
nated, and often quite peripheral.
Training courses, however, do certainly contribute to
China’s diplomatic engagement in Africa, and can deﬁnitely
be seen to be part of a wider exertion of ‘‘soft power”.
Establishing connections with many thousands of African
participants from diverse government departments and
programs and diﬀerent levels of seniority from across the
continent, builds up to a huge resource to be drawn on in
the future. The good will and the positive experience of China
expressed almost universally by participants adds to this.
Even if knowledge, skills and technology transfers do not
result in tangible, immediate impacts, the longer run beneﬁts
of this engagement are substantial, as China establishes itself
as a major partner of African countries. Training courses, as
an important and growing element of Chinese development
cooperation, therefore represent more than simply knowledge,
skills and technology transfer, and are located in a wider con-
text of engagement, that has political, commercial and foreign
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